30 Jul.
Recurring

Deutsch Intensiv-Kurs S2 2024

Veranstaltungsort: n.n. (AAU)

Deutsch Intensivkurs für Teilnehmer/innen ab 17 Jahren, verschiedene Niveaustufen: Einstufungstest am ersten Kurstag; 2- bis 9-wöchige Variante möglich;kommunikativer SprachunterrichtFreizeitprogramm 24 UE (à 45 Min.) pro Woche

31 Jul.
Recurring

Deutsch Intensiv-Kurs S2 2024

Veranstaltungsort: n.n. (AAU)

Deutsch Intensivkurs für Teilnehmer/innen ab 17 Jahren, verschiedene Niveaustufen: Einstufungstest am ersten Kurstag; 2- bis 9-wöchige Variante möglich;kommunikativer SprachunterrichtFreizeitprogramm 24 UE (à 45 Min.) pro Woche

1 Aug.
Recurring

Second International Klagenfurt Wittgenstein Workshop

Veranstaltungsort: O.0.01

This year’s Klagenfurt Workshop will examine the work of some of the most challenging, insightful, influential, controversial commentators on Philosophical Investigations, §§243-308. Unit I of the Workshop will focus on the work of John McDowell, especially his reading of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument. We will move inUnit II to an examination of Barry Stroud’s textually subtle undoing of what one might call the standard reading of the private language argument.Unit III will be devoted to Stanley Cavell’s development – in Part IV of The Claim of Reason – of Wittgenstein’s treatment of privacy, expression, and skepticism about the possibility of knowledge of other minds.

1 Aug.
Recurring

Second International Klagenfurt Wittgenstein Workshop

Veranstaltungsort: O.0.01

This year’s Klagenfurt Workshop will examine the work of some of the most challenging, insightful, influential, controversial commentators on Philosophical Investigations, §§243-308. Unit I of the Workshop will focus on the work of John McDowell, especially his reading of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument. We will move inUnit II to an examination of Barry Stroud’s textually subtle undoing of what one might call the standard reading of the private language argument.Unit III will be devoted to Stanley Cavell’s development – in Part IV of The Claim of Reason – of Wittgenstein’s treatment of privacy, expression, and skepticism about the possibility of knowledge of other minds.